Defining the limits to abuse of process: Lim Geok Lin Andy v Yap Jin Meng Bryan by QUEK ANDERSON, Dorcas
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
1-2018
Defining the limits to abuse of process: Lim Geok
Lin Andy v Yap Jin Meng Bryan
Dorcas QUEK ANDERSON
Singapore Management University, dorcasquek@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
This Case note/Digest is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
QUEK ANDERSON, Dorcas. Defining the limits to abuse of process: Lim Geok Lin Andy v Yap Jin Meng Bryan. (2018). Civil Justice
Quarterly. 37, (1), 40-47. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2598
Civil Justice Quarterly 2017 Issue 4 (forthcoming) 
 1 
Defining the limits to abuse of process 
Lim Geok Lin Andy v Yap Jin Meng Bryan [2017] SGCA 46 
 
Dorcas Quek Anderson1 
Abstract 
The abuse of process jurisdiction, which forms part of the doctrine of res judicata, is meant 
to uphold finality of litigation and prevent abusive litigation. While the jurisdiction has been 
applied to the original parties of earlier court proceedings, it could also prevent a person 
who was not part of earlier court proceedings from litigating his claim.  In such 
circumstances, the abuse of process doctrine has to be cognisant of the commercial realities 
and motivations driving choices to advance separate rather than consolidated proceedings, 
while also protecting litigants from repeated litigation. A recent Singapore Court of Appeal 
decision imposed constraints to applying the abuse of process jurisdiction to persons not 
involved in earlier proceedings. It also departed from the UK jurisprudence in its assessment 
of a person’s decision to defer his action till the completion of a closely related case. This 
note discusses the impact of the decision on the future ambit of the abuse of process 
jurisdiction, and highlights the crucial interests that should be balanced in determining 
whether abuse of process applies to new parties.  
 
 
Introduction  
Abuse of process, which is part of the doctrine of res judicata, is founded on the need to 
ensure finality of litigation and to guard against abusive litigation: Virgin Atlantic Airways 
Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd.2 It is usually raised as an alternative argument when strict res 
judicata – issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel –  cannot be established. However, the 
jurisdiction for abuse of process is discretionary, hinging on the court’s assessment of all the 
interests and circumstances of the case. When exercised liberally, the abuse of process 
jurisdiction may shut out a person’s opportunity to a day in court. When applied very 
narrowly, it could render the doctrine meaningless by allowing oppressive litigation to 
continue unchecked.  
 
While finding abuse of process is ultimately a balancing exercise, a lack of clarity in defining 
the interests being balanced potentially causes great uncertainty to litigants. This is 
particularly so when abuse of process could prevent a person who was not part of earlier 
court proceedings from litigating his claim. The Singapore Court of Appeal in Lim Geok Lin 
Andy v Yap Jin Meng Bryan3 recently found that abuse of process existed in such a situation. 
In doing so, it imposed strict constraints to applying abuse of process to persons not involved 
in earlier proceedings. This decision also departed from the UK jurisprudence in its 
assessment of a person’s decision to defer his action till the completion of a closely related 
case, a common scenario in commercial disputes involving multiple parties. This note 
discusses the impact of the decision on the future ambit of the abuse of process jurisdiction, 
and highlights the crucial interests that should be balanced in determining whether abuse of 
process applies to new parties.  
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The brief facts 
The respondent Bryan Yap (Yap), the appellant Andy Lim (Lim), and their mutual friend 
Lim Koon Park (Park) formed a joint venture vehicle to acquire and resell two properties at a 
profit. Only Yap provided the initial capital for the investment. There was an alleged 
agreement to split the profits from the sale proceeds in a 2:1:1 ratio. The investment vehicle 
subsequently had difficulty maintaining a loan used to fund the purchases, leading to a 
restructuring of the parties’ shareholdings. Yap, who injected additional capital, then asked 
Lim and Park to transfer their shares to him. Only Lim did so, while Park held on to his 
shares.  
 
After the properties were sold, Park commenced an action in 2010 claiming a 25% share of 
the profits. Lim’s testimony in this suit supported Park’s case concerning the agreed 
distribution of profits. He also stated that he had a separate agreement with Yap to maintain a 
share in the profits despite his divesting of his shares. Park’s claim was unsuccessful in the 
first instance, but the Court of Appeal decided in his favour and ordered an inquiry to 
determine his share of the profits. Lim then commenced proceedings against Yap to claim for 
a share of the profits. He also made an unsuccessful attempt to intervene in the inquiry on 
profits, arguing that his claim was the same as Park’s. 
 
Lim asserted in his suit that Yap had assured him that the divestment of his shares would not 
affect his entitlement to the profits. In addition, he raised two arguments concerning the 
quantum of profits. First, he alleged that Yap promised him profits of at least S$1.55m. 
Secondly, he contended that there was an agreement for Yap to bear the holding costs of the 
property for at least 18 months after the date of purchase. A full trial on these issues took 
place in the High Court. The High Court rejected Lim’s arguments, and also held that his 
entire suit was an abuse of process. Lim was deemed a privy to Park and allowing his claim 
would thus be tantamount to a collateral attack on the earlier decision of Park’s claim. 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision that Lim’s claim amounted to an abuse of process. 
The apex court found that he and Park had privity of interest, and that his suit amounted to a 
collateral attack on the Court of Appeal’s decision on Park’s claim. Further, given Lim’s 
knowledge and involvement in Park’s claim, his claim should have been heard together with 
Park’s. Nevertheless, Lim gave no bona fide reason for not advancing his suit earlier. 
Although the court found abuse of process, it proceeded in the alternative to consider the 
merits of Park’s arguments and rejected them.  
 
 
Is abuse of process applicable to a “stranger” to the earlier proceedings? 
The court endorsed the approach in Johnson v Gore Wood (Johnson) in determining whether 
there is abuse of process – making a broad, merits-based judgment taking into account the 
public and private interests involved, and all the facts of the case. The court summed up this 
discretionary approach as striking a balance “between allowing a litigant with a genuine 
claim his day in court, and ensuring that the litigation process is not…unduly oppressive to 
the defendant”. Some of the circumstances to be considered include whether the later 
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proceedings were a collateral attack on the previous decision; whether there were bona fide 
reasons for not raising the issue earlier; whether there was fresh evidence warranting re-
litigation; and whether there were special circumstances justifying allowing the case to 
proceed. 4 This stance mirrors the UK approach of considering all the relevant interests, 
including preventing collateral attacks and putting the administration of justice in disrepute: 
Arthur J.S. Hall & Co v Simons and Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands. 5  
 
Abuse of process, while overlapping with the res judicata doctrine, has generally been 
applied only when issue estoppel or cause of action estoppel cannot be found. The court, 
citing Henderson v Henderson, affirmed that this jurisdiction applied to points that may not 
have been decided earlier but “properly belonged to the subject of litigation”, which the 
parties might have brought forward earlier.6 Prior to this case, the Singapore courts have 
limited the application of abuse of process to such situations only. The court has thus termed 
abuse of process as the extended doctrine of res judicata, because it extends the reach of issue 
and cause of action estoppel “to cases where the point was not previously decided because it 
was not raised in the earlier proceedings even though it could and should have been raised in 
those proceedings”: Royal Bank of Scotland NV v TT International Ltd.7  
 
The court now faced a new situation of applying abuse of process to parties who were not 
part of the earlier court action. Seven years ago, the English and Wales Court of Appeal in 
Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group Plc (Aldi) decided that abuse of process could apply when the 
plaintiff was suing a party who was not a defendant in the earlier suit. Thomas LJ held that 
there was no rule that no abuse could be found unless the defendant in the subsequent suit 
had sufficient identity with the defendant in the earlier action. While the fact that the 
defendants were different could be a powerful factor to be considered, identity of parties was 
not a pre-condition to the courts’ application of abuse of process. 8 Notably, the plaintiff in 
Johnson v Gore was different from the claimant in the earlier action, but this also did not 
prevent the court from considering the applicability of the abuse of process jurisdiction.9 
 
In contrast to the Aldi decision, the Singapore court appeared to require privity before abuse 
of process could apply to parties not involved in the earlier proceedings. It observed that in 
many abuse of process decisions concerning the same plaintiff suing different defendants, 
there was generally no abuse unless the defendants were related by “privity of interest”, 
connoting a close or special relationship, or commonality of interest according to Gleeson v J 
Wippell & Co Ltd (Gleeson).10 It reasoned that this defence could similarly apply when a 
defendant was sued twice by different plaintiffs.  In summation, the court seemed to require a 
“connection” between the parties:11  
In our judgment, the rule in Henderson is applicable where some connection can be 
shown between the party seeking to relitigate the issue and the earlier proceeding 
where that essential issue was litigated, which would make it unjust to allow that 
party to reopen the issue. There is no reason in principle why the rule in Henderson 
ought to be confined only to repeated claims by the same plaintiff or to repeated 
claims against the same defendant. It is important to also emphasise not only the fact-
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sensitive nature of the inquiry that is entailed in applying the rule in Henderson but 
also the strict limits within which such a rule will be applied.  
 
What such “connection” entails will be discussed below. It is significant here that the 
requirement of a connection invariably results in a stricter applicability of the abuse of 
process jurisdiction, thus restraining the exercise of the court’s discretion to fetter the 
litigation activity of individuals not involved in earlier proceedings. The current approach in 
England and Wales is more lenient. Although Thomas LJ in Aldi highlighted the need to take 
into account the presence of a different defendant, this factor did not ultimately weigh heavily 
in the court’s balancing exercise. After weighing the interests of Aldi against the interests of 
the new defendants, the court decided that Aldi’s needs prevailed particularly since Aldi had 
earlier made known to the defendants the potential pursuit of its claim.12 In Johnson, Lord 
Millett appeared to doubt the correctness of the new plaintiff’s concession that it was in 
privity with Johnson, the first plaintiff. In doing so, he highlighted the need to specifically 
consider the needs of the new party before concluding that the action was an abuse of 
process. In this regard, there could well be legitimate reasons for the second plaintiff to defer 
his claim. Having a second plaintiff commence a suit also did not necessarily amount to 
double vexation, since the defendant was always liable to be sued by two different plaintiffs, 
each with their own causes of action and heads of losses.13  
 
Accordingly, it is not inconceivable how the abuse of process doctrine can be overextended 
in multi-party disputes if there were no limits imposed. The balance between the interests of 
preventing oppressive litigation and a new party’s interest of litigating his claim may not be 
properly struck. In this connection, Zuckerman has argued that there has to be some factor 
which connects the stranger with the earlier proceedings and which could render it unjust to 
allow the proceedings to proceed under the abuse of process jurisdiction. He referred to a few 
cases that illustrated the sufficient connection that must be established.14 His suggested 
approach is strikingly parallel to the Singapore court’s approach of requiring privity between 
the original party and the new party.  
 
 
What if the stranger allows his battle to be fought by someone else? 
 
In deciding whether there was privity of interest that justified finding abuse of process, the 
Singapore court referred to the Privy Council decision in The Nana Ofori Atta II (Nana 
Ofori).15 In this appeal from a West African court, the Orikro of Muranam (Muranam) earlier 
made an unsuccessful claim against the Stool of Banka for a title in certain lands. 
Subsequently Muranam joined the Stool of Abuakwa (Abuakwa) to claim title to the same 
land. The Privy Council upheld the West African Court of Appeal’s decision to disallow the 
claim based on estoppel by conduct. Lord Denning approved of the West African court’s 
application of a principle articulated in Wytcherley v Andrew16 –   
 
“…if a person, knowing what was passing, was content to stand by and see his battle 
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fought by somebody else in the same interest, he should not be allowed to re-open 
the case”.  
 
Lord Denning took the view that Abuakwa should have applied to be joined earlier as co-
plaintiff to Muranam, since his interest in the land was same as Muronam’s. However, 
Abuakwa was content to stand by and let Muronam fight his battle, and then try to re-open 
the same question five years later.  
 
How appropriate is the Wytcherley principle to finding abuse of process? It is significant to 
recognise two elements embedded within this principle. First, the principle implicitly 
assumed that the two parties have “the same interest”, an idea associated with privity and 
finding a connection between the parties. Secondly, the principle reflects disapproval of the 
person’s conduct of waiting and letting another fight his case, despite his interests being 
aligned with the earlier claimant. This aspect is more associated with the court’s assessment 
of litigation conduct and other circumstances under the abuse of process jurisdiction.  
 
Both these aspects have been merged within Wytcherley v Andrew, resulting in a lack of 
clarity concerning which doctrine the principle relates to. In the UK, the Wytcherley principle 
has been subsumed under the concept of “privity of interests”. Privity of blood, title or 
interest has conventionally been used to establish identity of parties for issue or cause of 
action estoppel: Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd.17 Unlike the first two types of 
privity, privity of interest is a more amorphous concept, its oft-cited test being the “existence 
of a sufficient degree of identification between the two parties to make it just to hold that the 
decision to which one was party should be binding in proceedings to which the other was 
party”: Gleeson.18  
 
The Wytcherley principle has been applied in relation to this test of finding privity of interest. 
Although the principle originated in the probate jurisdiction (In the Estate of Langton, 
decd19), the English and Welsh Court of Appeal in House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite 
extended its application for the general purpose of finding privity of interest in res judicata.20 
Incidentally, Spencer Bower and Handley, when commenting on these cases, stated that 
parties who could intervene in earlier proceedings but did not, are considered parties in 
personam to the action, thus reinforcing the concept of privity.21 The Court of Appeal in 
Resolution Chemicals Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S (Resolution Chemicals) also endorsed Waite’s 
approach by stating:22   
“One type of case where privity is recognised is where C knows of proceedings 
between A and B in which his rights are being tested but stands back and does 
nothing.” 
 
Here, the testing of C’s rights by a related party amounts to “sufficient connection” for the 
purpose of satisfying the Gleeson test.  As to whether it is just to hold C bound to the suit 
between A and B, the principle seems to conclude that it is unjust for C to stand back when 
he knows of the earlier proceedings.  
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Unlike the above English and Welsh decisions, the Singapore court alluded to the Wytcherley 
principle in relation to the doctrine of abuse of process, and not in determining whether there 
was privity of interests. With reference to the latter issue, the court, in reliance on Gleeson, 
focused on finding a close connection in the form of a special relationship or commonality of 
interests. Having found that such a connection existed because Lim’s claim arose from the 
same agreement and backdrop as Park’s, the court’s decision then focused primarily on 
evaluating the interests involved under the Henderson abuse of process jurisdiction. The 
Wytcherley principle was alluded to in this context. The court considered that Lim’s action 
was tantamount to a re-litigation of the parties’ entitlement to profits and consequently a 
collateral attack on the court’s earlier decision. Furthermore, Lim was clearly aware of his 
claim being potentially precluded by abuse of process. Given Lim’s alignment of interests, 
knowledge of Park’s suit and involvement as a witness, it was inexplicable why he could not 
have commenced his action earlier and consolidated it with Park’s.23  
 
There may, on first blush, seem to be little difference between evaluating a person’s litigation 
conduct under privity of interest and under abuse of process. It is, however, submitted that 
there are significant challenges when considering conduct under privity of interest. The 
Gleeson articulation of privity of interests has been criticised as being circuitous. It does little 
to shed light on the nature and degree of interest required to find privity.24 Instead it directs 
the inquiry to the justice of the circumstances, which is effectively the court’s exercise of its 
discretion under the abuse of process jurisdiction. In the context of this ambivalent test, the 
Wytcherley principle can be potentially misapplied to find privity of interests; the mere 
finding that the person waited and allowed someone else to fight a closely related claim could 
be construed against him or her. The other relevant interests that the court usually considers 
under the Johnson approach, such as the reasons for waiting, may be inadvertently 
overlooked. There are serious consequences when such a broad understanding of privity of 
interest is then applied also to strict res judicata in the form of issue or cause of action 
estoppel. As observed by Briggs J in Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills v 
Potiwal, the law should be slow to recognise privity of interest between different persons 
because of the automatic and far-reaching effects it would have when cause of action or issue 
estoppel is found.25   
 
It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the Court of Appeal in Resolution Chemicals deemed it 
necessary to impose some constraints to finding privity of interest. It underscored the 
importance of inquiring “whether it is just that the new party should be bound by the outcome 
of the previous litigation”, apart from determining whether the new party had an interest in 
the litigation outcome and was in reality a party to the earlier proceedings because of the 
particular relationship.26 Interestingly, Zuckerman interpreted Resolution Chemicals to be a 
decision on abuse of process, though it was ostensibly made concerning privity of interests in 
finding cause of action and issue estoppel. He suggested that when the concept of privity is 
used widely, it is better dealt with under the abuse of process jurisdiction, citing Resolution 
Chemicals as providing the relevant guiding principles.27 Perhaps the entire concept of privity 
of interests (including the Wytcherley principle) ought to be considered not in relation to 
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strict res judicata but in abuse of process, as suggested. Under the abuse of process 
jurisdiction, one factor considered would be the new party’s act of waiting when he or she 
could have commenced action earlier. It will, however, not be the sole factor taken into 
account in the court’s exercise of its broad merits-based discretion. 
 
It is crucial for the Wytcherley principle to be applied within the broad framework of abuse of 
process. In this regard, the Singapore court stressed that the inquiry into abuse hinges on the 
particular facts of the case, and that it had to balance the new party’s interests in having his 
day in court with the need to protect the earlier party from abusive litigation. An undue 
emphasis of the Wytcherley principle tends to focus disproportionately on the latter as the 
principle concentrates on the person’s conduct of waiting. However, the Singapore court 
stressed the importance of considering the reasons why the person acted the way he did.28 
This is similar to Lord Millett’s call in Johnson to consider whether there are legitimate 
reasons to defer the claim, rather than to automatically deem the person’s decision to wait as 
abusive behaviour.  
 
On the present facts, the court could not be persuaded that Lim had good reasons to wait. On 
the contrary, it agreed with the lower court that Lim’s behaviour in advancing a belated claim 
was opportunistic. The court probably thought this way because Lim raised new arguments to 
specifically circumvent the basis for the court’s earlier decision concerning the distribution of 
profits. This belated attempt to introduce new arguments to change the quantum of profits 
and the way it was distributed was deemed to be a collateral attack. Additionally, the court 
appeared to find it even more reprehensible that Lim had earlier argued that his claim was the 
same as Park when trying to intervene in the inquiry of profits, but now alleged that his claim 
was different due to additional evidence and arguments. Such inconsistency probably played 
no small part in resulting in the balance being tilted against Lim’s favour.29 
 
Lim could arguably have a valid reason to wait since his claim rested on a slightly different 
factual background from Park’s; he alleged that he had a separate agreement with Yap to 
retain the agreed share of profits despite divesting his shares. However, Lim’s other 
arguments concerning the minimum amount of profits promised to him and the costs Yap 
would bear directly inpinged on the court’s earlier decision on the distribution of profits. It is 
very likely that Lim’s entire claim would not be deemed a collateral attack if he had simply 
advanced his first argument about the separate agreement, without arguing against the court’s 
earlier decision on profits. His act of waiting was deemed reprehensible because of his 
overall conduct of taking inconsistent positions and advancing new arguments to directly 
contravene the court’s earlier decision. 
 
Conclusion 
Multi-party disputes are increasingly common in many commercial spheres such as the 
construction industry. The doctrine of res judicata has to be cognisant of the commercial 
realities and motivations driving choices to advance separate rather than consolidated 
proceedings, while also protecting litigants from repeated litigation. Although each decision 
concerning abuse of process necessarily hinges on the specific facts, it is important to 
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articulate the exact interests being balanced, as well as the particular factors to be carefully 
considered when a new party is involved in subsequent litigation. Otherwise the delicate 
balance which the abuse of process jurisdiction is meant to maintain may be go awry.  
 
This Singapore decision has imposed limitations to the abuse of process jurisdiction by 
requiring privity of interests before different parties are prevented from advancing their 
claim, thus preventing the abuse of process jurisdiction from being over-extended. 
Additionally, the conduct of waiting to advance one’s claim was considered in conjunction 
with all other factors weighed in the broad, merits-based inquiry of the interests involved. 
Given how the Singapore courts have allowed very few exceptions to cause of action and 
issue estoppel, it is prudent that it has now circumscribed the ambit of abuse of process 
jurisdiction. Res judicata should, after all, have stringent application to the original parties to 
the earlier proceedings. Circumspection is needed before extending res judicata to other 
parties who have tenuous connections with the original disputants, and who have valid 
reasons for commencing their action later.  
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